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ABSTRACT
Economic theory has developed a typology of markets which de-
pends upon the number of firms which are present. Much of the
literature, however, is set in the context of a given market structure,
with the consequences of the structure being explored. Consider-
ably less attention is paid to the process by which any particular
structure emerges. In this paper, we examine the process of how
different types of market structure emerge in new product markets,
and in particular on markets which are primarily web-based. A
wide range of outcome is possible. But the uncertainty of outcome
of the evolution of market shares in such markets is based, not
on the various strategies of the firms. Instead, it is inherent in
the behavioral rule of choice used by consumers. We examine the
consequences, for the market structure which emerges, of a realistic
behavioral rule for consumer choice in new product markets. The
rule has been applied in a range of different empirical contexts.
It is essentially based on the model of genetic drift pioneered by
Sewall Wright in the inter-war period. We identify the parameter
ranges in the model in which the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is
likely to fall within the ranges identified by the US Department of
Justice: unconcentrated markets; moderately concentrated markets
and highly concentrated markets.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory has developed a typology of markets which depends upon
the number of firms which are present. We move from perfect competition, to
imperfect competition, through oligopoly to monopoly. Much of the literature,
however, is set in the context of a given market structure, with the consequences
of the structure being explored. Considerably less attention is paid to the
process by which any particular structure emerges.
Perhaps the market structure where the evolutionary nature of the outcome
figures most strongly is that of oligopoly. It is recognized that outcomes on
factors such as pricing and market shares are at their least determinate under
the market structure of oligopoly, and, in consequence, the emergent nature
of the market structure is often taken into account. Rothschild (1947), for
example, introduced the concept of price being the “expression of a strategic
policy”. The path-breaking works of Bain (1956) and Labini (1969) emphasized
the importance of non-price competition, and the role of both the barriers to
and the threats of entry. Caves and Porter (1977) formulated the entry process
as ”an investment decision made under uncertainty and conjectural ”interde-
pendence”. They argued that “the indeterminateness of oligopoly inevitably
spills over to the entry process in the form of recognized interdependence
between going firms and potential entrants”. Sutton (2002), suggests that
“indeterminacy. . . relating to multiple equilibria is endemic throughout the
literature on market structure”.
However, it is possibly in Austrian economics that the importance of
the process of the evolution of the market is most evident. Hayek (1948)
examined the learning and discovery processes of firms in “dynamic competi-
tion”. Schumpeter (1942) coined his famous phrase about the “gales of creative
destruction”, bringing to the forefront the evolutionary nature of capitalism.
In this paper, we examine the process of how different types of market
structure emerge in new product markets, and in particular on markets which
are primarily web-based. A fundamental characteristic of new product markets
is that, quite literally, they are new, so that consumers find it hard to distinguish
between the attributes of the alternatives. In such circumstances, a product
which has objectively inferior attributes to a rival might nevertheless obtain a
higher market share.
A classic illustration is the clash between Betamax and VHS in the video
recorder market in the 1980s. This decade also saw the publication of the
paper by Arthur (1989), in which he demonstrate conditions under which
one of two competing new technologies would inevitably gain a market share
approaching 100 per cent, but that it would not be possible to predict ex ante
which of the two it would be. In Arthur’s model, a Polya urn problem in
non-linear probability theory, consumers adopt one of two alternatives without
regard to the attributes of the alternatives.
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The question examined by Arthur, namely the consequences for the market
structure which emerges when consumers select without regard to the attributes
of the alternatives on offer, is also analysed by Kirman (1993). This paper,
too, is highly cited in the economics literature. As we show below, it is also a
Polya urn model, a genre which has many interesting variants.
Kirman developed his model to explain the outcomes of experiments with a
colony of ants visiting two food piles. On leaving the nest, an ant has the choice
of two paths along which it can go and forage for food. In the experiments,
there is a food pile along each path, and the food piles are adjusted so they
remain identical in size regardless of how many grains are removed. However,
the ant has no knowledge that it is certain to find food regardless of which of
the two paths it takes. Instead, it adopts a copying strategy, based upon the
behavior of ants returning to the nest after (successfully) foraging.
Kirman suggests that this model is relevant to the understanding of financial
markets, where the principle of “recruitment or contagion” (p. 149) to rival
modes of behavior is important. Extensions of the model have subsequently
been developed to try and explain fundamental features of asset price changes
(Lux, 1998).
Both the Arthur and the Kirman models offer valuable insights into agent
choices in circumstances in which it is difficult to distinguish between the
attributes of alternatives, and so agents rely on rules of behavior based upon
copying the observed behavior of other agents, or “recruitment or contagion”,
as Kirman puts it. However, as we discuss in Section 2 below, the models
make assumptions which confine their potential applications to quite specific
circumstances.
A more general and, in the context of consumer choice in new product
markets, more realistic model is is ultimately based on the model of genetic
drift pioneered by Sewall Wright in the inter-war period (1931). Condensing
the model to its essentials, most of the time agents choose amongst not just two,
but potentially a large number of alternatives by copying from the choices made
by agents who have already made their selections. In addition, occasionally
the choice is based on a type of random selection.
This model has been successfully applied in a range of different empirical
contexts. The model has had considerable application in anthropology and
cultural evolution, where it is often referred to as the “neutral” model of
selection. In other words, when agents select between alternatives, they are
“neutral” with respect to their attributes. Examples include Neiman (1995),
Shennan and Wilkinson (2001), Bentley et al. (2004), Mesoudi and Lycett
(2009), Bentley et al. (2011b), and Bentley and Ormerod (2012).
A wide range of outcomes is possible under reasonable sets of parameter
values of the model, and the range is inherent in the behavioral rule of choice
used by consumers. A particular interest in the results is the condition
under which various ranges of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market
36 Camila C. S. Caiado and Paul Ormerod
concentration emerge, the index of course being used by many of the regulatory
authorities on competition.
Section 2 discusses the behavioral model from an economic perspective. In
Section 3, we set out a formal description of the model, and in Section 4 we
present the results.
2 The Neutral Model of Selection: The Economic Background
The idea that agents may base their choices not on a comparison of the
attributes of the alternatives, as in rational choice theory, but imitate in
some way the choices made by other agents has a distinguished pedigree in
economics. Alchian (1950) considered uncertainty and economic theory from
an evolutionary perspective. As Ormerod (2015) points out, he anticipated by
decades many of the insights of the modern mathematical articulation of the
theory of evolution.1
Alchian considered the behavior of firms under uncertainty, which he defines
as being characterized by both imperfect foresight and human inability to
solve complex problems containing a host of variables even when an optimum
is definable. Although he set his argument in the context of firms, he suggests
that the argument is readily transferable to consumer behavior. Alchian takes
into account that humans are not like other species. We can imagine the
future, act with purpose and intent and consciously adapt our behavior.
He postulates that, even in the face of uncertainty, at least a local optimum
might be found if firms follow what we would now term a Bayesian learning
process. However, for convergence to an equilibrium, he argues that two
conditions need to be satisfied. A particular trial strategy must be capable of
being deemed a success or failure ex post, and the position achieved must be
comparable with results of other potential actions. Alchian argues that it is
unlikely that such conditions will hold in practice, for the simple reason that
the external environment of a firm is not static but changing. Comparability
of resulting situations is destroyed by the changing environment.
In such circumstances, Alchian argues that the appropriate rule of behavior
is simply to imitate, as far as possible, observed success. He allows for the
possibility of innovation, of devising a new strategy yourself, but the basic
principle is to observe someone you believe to be doing well and to try and
copy them.
Simon, in his seminal paper on behavioral economics, rasied fundamental
doubts about the ability of agents in general to process information in the
way which is implied by rational choice theory. He wrote “the task is to
replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior
which is compatible with the access to information and the computational
1The discussion of the Alchian paper is largely based on Ormerod (2015)
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capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the
kinds of environment in which such organisms exist” (Simon, 1955a, p. 99).
In another major paper published in the same year (1955b), Simon identified
one such type of behavior, which is also based upon the principle of imitation.
The opening sentence of his paper reads: “It is the purpose of this paper
to analyse a class of distribution functions that appears in a wide range
of empirical data – particularly data describing sociological, biological and
economic phenomena. Its appearance is so frequent, and the phenomna in
which it appears so diverse, that one is led to the conjecture that if these
phenomena have any property in common it can only be similarity in the
structure of the underlying probability mechanisms” (p. 425).
In the context of a consumer entering a new product market, he or she
chooses amongst the alternatives with a probability equal to the proportions
in which they have already been selected by consumers who have already made
their choice. This mechanism has subsequently become known as “preferential
attachment”, following the heavily cited paper by Barabási and Albert (1999),
in which they discovered the mechanism independently, apparently unaware of
Simon”s path breaking article written over forty years previously.
In general, the behavioral choice rule of preferential attachment (PA) leads
to highly skewed non-Gaussian outcomes. Such outcomes characterize many
social and economic situations. Simon, for example, mentioned distributions of
scientists by numbers of papers published; distributions of cities by populations;
distributions of incomes by size. Ormerod (2012) cites a number of other, quite
disparate right-skewed non-Gaussian outcomes: viewings on YouTube; film
producers’ earnings; the number of sexual partners people have; the size of
price changes in financial assets; crowds at soccer matches; firm sizes; the size
and length of economic recessions; the frequency of different types of endgames
in chess; sizes of cities; the ratings of American football coaches in USA Today ;
the distribution of £1 million homes across London boroughs; unemployment
rates by county in America; deaths in wars; the number of churches per county
in William the Conqueror’s Domesday Book survey of England in the late
eleventh century.
The modelling approach of PA differs from that based upon the concept of
rational addiction with preferences which are learned and are intertemporally
dependent (Becker and Murphy, 1988). Under preferential attachment, agents
are not required to learn preferences over time. Indeed, the preferences of any
given agent are not formed over time. At any point in time, an agent makes a
choice based simply on the choices made by others.
PA is a powerful model in many contexts, but is not capable of explaining
the turnover in rankings which takes place over time. The time scale of this may
vary enormously across different contexts, but it is still a key feature. Batty
(2006), for example, analyses turnover in the largest cities, in the USA and
in the world. With the former, over the 1790–2000 period, 266 cities were at
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some stage in the top hundred. From the year 1840, when the number of cities
first reached one hundred, only twenty-one remain in the top hundred of 2000.
On average, it takes 105 years for 50 per cent of cities to appear or disappear
from the top hundred, whilst the average change in rank order for a typical
city in each ten-year period is seven ranks. In complete contrast, Ormerod
(op.cit.) notes that over the entire period from 1952 to 2006, no fewer than
29,056 songs appeared in the Top 100 chart in the UK. Of these, 5,141 were in
the chart for just a single week. Almost exactly a half stayed in for less than a
month, so four weeks was the typical life span, as it were, of a song in the Top
100. In contrast, fifty-nine remained popular for more than six months, and
one, “My Way” by Frank Sinatra, spent an incredible 122 weeks in the chart.
The cultural evolution literature offers a behavioral rule of choice which
is mainly based upon the process of PA. However, with a small probability, an
agent can, for example, select an alternative which no-one else has previously
selected. Or the agent could make a random choice from a fixed number of
alternatives. The inspiration for such models is the work of geneticists such
as Sewall Wright. Agents in the model are “neutral” to the attributes of the
alternatives. This could be because in a new product market they find it very
hard to understand the differences. There may indeed be objective differences
between the various offers, but in such numerous, minor and often incomprehen-
sible ways that they exemplify what has come to be called “decision quicksand”
(Sela and Berger, 2012) or “decision fatigue” (Baumeister and Tierney, 2011).
A further refinement of the neutral selection model is to introduce a
parameter which determines how far back an agent looks when taking into
account the previous choices made by other agents (Bentley et al., 2011a, 2014,
2014). The mechanism of PA implicitly assumes that agents take into account
all previous choices. But, clearly, in practice this will rarely be the case. In
teenage music markets, for example, the consumers are usually not interested
in anything more than a few weeks, or at most a few months, old. The fact
that the Beatles were extremely popular in the 1960s plays no role in the
selections which they make today. Gleeson et al. (2015) show that the model
incorporating the memory time of agents provides an excellent fit to empirical
micro-blogging data on hashtag usage. In addition, it is able to predict novel
scaling features of the data.
Essentially, then, the neutral model of consumer choice is based upon
the principle of preferential attachment, modified by the introduction of a
parameter which specifies the previous time period over which choices are
counted, and by an “innovation” parameter, which allows various types of
random choice to be made.
Before moving to a more formal description of the cultural evolution model,
it is useful to conclude this section by a brief comparison with the Arthur and
Kirman models mentioned in the section 1 above, both of which are familiar
to economists.
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All three models are based upon the principle of copying or imitation.
However, there are two fundamental differences between the Arthur and
Kirman models and the model of cultural evolution. Both the Arthur and
the Kirman models involve agents selecting between just two alternatives. In
contrast, in the cultural evolution model, agents select from many alternatives.
As a special case, the model could contain only two alternatives, but in the
general case there are many.
The second main difference is that in the Arthur and Kirman models the
agent only takes into account the proportions with which other agents have
selected at time (t− 1). In the preferential attachment model, a special case
of the cultural evolution model, agents take into account the choices made
in all previous time steps. The addition of the memory parameter makes the
model completely general in this respect, and therefore non-Markovian. In
different contexts, agents will take into account differing amounts of time steps
of choices made by other agents. The cultural evolution model is therefore
considerably more general.
It is well known that the Arthur model is based on a special case of the
Polya urn problem. The Kirman model is simply a variant of the model
proposed by Friedman (1949) and which is a well known stochastic process
(Feller, 1951; Freedman, 1965).
3 The Formal Model
Consider a model populated initially by N agents. These each select at random
one of k1 products. We assume that each firm produces only one product.
Further, there is no re-contracting by agents during any particular solution of
the model. The model proceeds in a series of steps. In each step, n(t) new
agents enter the model, where the number n(t) is determined by a standard
logistic growth function. Logistic growth characterizes the adoption patterns
observed in new product markets in general, generating the familiar S-shaped
curve of adoption.
With probability (1− µ), an agent copies the choice of product from that
of an existing agent within the previous m time steps, or else with probability
µ, the agent chooses a product at random. In other words, the agent either
copies an existing agent from the last m steps, or chooses at random. In
keeping with the cultural evolution literature, we refer to the parameter µ as
the “innovation” parameter. In this particular context, however, “innovation”
refers simply to the act of choosing at random.
We allow the possibility of products being introduced in addition to the k1
available in the initialisation of the model, so that in all subsequent steps the
random choice is made from a total of k = (k1 + k2) products.
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Agents 1,1, 2,1, …, 1 ,1 enter the model= 1:
For = 1, … , 1
Agent ,1 selects product ,1 at random 
from 1 possible products each with 
probability 1/ 1.
Set ∈ ℕ, 1 ∈ ℕ, 1 ≤ , ∈ ℕ, ∈ [0,1].
Select 1 , 2 , … , ∈ ℕ, 1 ≤ ≤ , T ∈ ℕ
For 1 < ≤ : Agents 1, , 2, , …, , enter the model
For = 1, … ,
Agent , selects product , from 1
possible products 1 ≤ ≤ 1with 
probability propor!onal to
 




If  − 1 = 0:
select  , at random from 
1 = possible products each 
with probability 1/ 1 .
Else
, ≔ 1 + 1
1 ≔ 1+1
Probability Probability 1 −
Figure 1: Flow Chart of the Solution Process of the Model.
The “memory” parameter m determines the number of steps of the previous
decisions of other agents over which an agent looks when making its decision.
The “innovation” parameter µ determines the probability with which an agent
takes a random decision rather than replicating one of the decisions previously
made by other agents. More formally, the algorithm is described by the flow
chart in Figure 1.
4 Results
4.1 Economic Focus and Choice of Parameters
Our focus in the results is the different levels of market concentration which
emerge in the solutions of the model. We calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing the
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squares of the individual firms’ market shares, and thus gives proportionately
greater weight to the larger market shares. The HHI is widely used by
competition authorities. The US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, for example, generally classify markets into three types2:
• Unconcentrated markets: HHI below 0.15
• Moderately Concentrated markets: HHI between 0.15 and 0.25
• Highly Concentrated markets: HHI above 0.25
In terms of the particular sets of results reported here, we set the initial









where P is population, C is carrying capacity (the total number of agents
who eventually buy a product in this market), and r defines the growth rate.
We set C equal to 1 million, and r = 0.001. The results of the model are
robust with respect to the choice of r. Essentially, for any given value of the
“innovation” parameter, there is a trade-off between the choice of r and the
choice of the memory parameter, m.3 With the values, reported here, carrying
capacity is reached after 9546 steps in the solution of the model.
Our main focus is on the market shares recorded for each product at “peak”
entry i.e. at the maximum value of dP/dt, which occurs at step 1946, when 250
agents enter the model.Initially, 10 products are available (k1 = 10), and after
initial step, agents can choose from a further 10 (k2 = 10), making 20 in total.
Previous analysis with variants of the neutral model similar to this one
(Bentley et al., 2011a, 2014, 2015) suggests that the sensitivity of the results
with respect to the choice of the memory parameter, m, declines as it increases.
So we examine here values of m from 1 through to 10. The same point obtains
with the “innovation” parameter, µ. Accordingly, we choose values of µ from
zero to 0.02 in steps of 0.0001, making 201 different values in total.
We therefore consider 2010 separate pairs of parameters. For each pair, we
obtain 1000 separate solutions of the model.4
4.2 Results
The basic features of the results are shown in Figures 2a and 2b. We focus in
these initial charts on values of the innovation parameter up to and including
2http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html#5c.
3Results demonstrating this are available on request from the authors.
4There is in fact virtually no difference between the results obtained with 1000 solutions
and those of only 100 solutions, so we can safely assume that we are reporting the converged
properties of the model for both the mean and the variance.
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Figure 2: (a) Mean values of the HH Index obtained across 1,000 separate solutions of the
model for each pair of the innovation and memory parameters examined. There are 1010
such combinations, with memory taking integer values from 1 through 10, and innovation
measured in steps from 0 to 0.01. The Index is evaluated in the step of the model in which
the number of agents entering and choosing is at its maximum, the point of inflexion in the
logistic growth model. (b) Standard deviation around the mean value in the 1000 separate
solutions of the model for each pair of the innovation and memory parameters.
0.01. This is because high levels of concentration are unlikely to be observed
for values of µ > 0.01, and so the real interest in the results is for values of
the innovation parameter below this level.
Figure 2a shows the mean value of the HHI index across 1000 separate
solutions of each of the 1010 pairs of parameters (with µ in the range zero to
0.01), and Figure 2b shows the standard deviation around the mean.
It is known analytically that for values of the memory and innovation
parameters of 1 and 0 respectively, in the limit the model generates a “winner
take all” solution, where the HH Index takes the value 1 of course. This result
is seen in the very top left of Figure 2a, where the memory and innovation
parameters take values close to 1 and 0 respectively. It is reflects in the top of
left of Figure 2b, where the standard deviation of the index around its mean
value in 1,000 solutions is very low.
Figure 2a makes clear that the mean value of market concentration falls as
both the memory and innovation parameters increase. However, Figure 2 shows
that there is a band of solutions were the outcome is particularly uncertain.
We plot here the standard deviation of the H index across each set of 1000
individual solutions. For low values of µ, except for values of both µ and m
which are in the immediate neighbourhood of the “winner take all” situation
at values of (0, 1), a wide range of outcomes is possible. In such circumstances,
even if we knew ex ante the precise values of the parameters, predicting the
outcome of any single solution would be inherently problematic.
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Figure 3: Mean values of the HH Index obtained across 1000 separate solutions of the
model for each pair of the innovation and memory parameters examined. There are 2010
such combinations, with memory taking integer values from 1 through 10, and innovation
measured in steps from 0 to 0.02. All solutions to the right of the 0.1 contour line have a
mean HH Index value of less than 0.1, all between the 0.1 and 0.15 contour lines have a
mean value between 0.1 and 0.15 etc.
Further information on the properties of the properties of the model is
shown in Figure 3. This reproduces Figure 2a, except that we extend the range
of values of the innovation parameter, µ, to 0.02. We also show contour lines
for the values of the HHI of 0.1, 0.15, 0.25 and 0.5. For example, all points on
the chart to the right of the 0.1 contour line have mean values of the index
across 1000 solutions, which are below 0.1, the points between 0.1 and 0.15
have values of the index in this range, and so on.
Figure 3 shows clearly that mean values of the HH Index which are of
concern to regulators (i.e. above 0.15) only emerge at low levels of the
innovation parameter. In other words, in situations in which social influence
on the choice made by individual agents is strong, in which their willingness
to act independently is low.
An alternative way of presenting the results with respect to the outcomes
for the HHI is to examine the empirical probability of obtaining values of the
index within particular ranges of the value of the index. We consider values of
the HHI below 0.15, between 0.15 and 0.25, between 0.25 and 1.0, which are
plotted in Figures 4a to c below. The charts are constructed in the following
way. For any given pair of parameters, we construct the empirical cumulative
distribution function based on the 1000 solutions.
Figure 4(a) shows the empirical probability P(H < 0.15) for each memory
and innovation pair. Memory clearly plays a large role in market competition.
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Figure 4: (a) shows an estimate of the frequency with which a value of the HH Index below
0.15 is obtained for each of the parameter pairs, based on 1000 separate solutions of the
model for each parameter pair. The Index is evaluated in the step of the model in which
the number of agents entering and choosing is at its maximum, the point of inflexion in the
logistic growth model. (b) shows the estimate of the frequency of a value of the HH Index
between 0.15 and 0.25, and (c) for values above 0.25.
Here we see that, the lower is the memory of the population, the higher
innovation needs to be in order to increase the odds of observing a low
concentration market.
Figure 4(b) shows the empirical probability P(0.15 < H < 0.25) for each
memory and innovation pair. It shows that there is an exponential trade-off be-
tween memory and innovation in moderately concentrated markets. The trend
displayed indicates that, the higher the memory, the easier it is to jump between
low and high concentration markets in low innovation scenarios; in fact, moder-
ately concentrated markets become rarer the higher the population’s memory.
Figure 4(c) shows the empirical probability P(H > 0.25) for each memory
and innovation pair. That is, the probability of observing a highly concen-
trated market. For long-memory models, innovation plays a large role in
keeping market competition up. We see that the lower the memory, the higher
innovation needs to be in order to observe a high concentration market. In
fact, the effect of innovation on the concentration index is roughly exponential
as a function of memory as noted in 4(b).
We can usefully examine the sensitivity of outcomes to the two behavioral
parameters, m and µ, by statistical analysis. A simple linear regression of the
mean value of the HH index obtained for each of the 2010 parameter pairs
(i.e. using values of µ up to 0.02) against the two parameters is summarized
in Table 1.
However, the Ramsey RESET specification test reveals a substantial amount
of non-linearity in the relationships. The calculated value of the F statistic to
test the null hypothesis of linearity is 2249.6, with (2,2005) degrees of freedom,
indicating a very decisive rejection.
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Table 1: Results of the simple linear regression of the mean value of the HH Index in each
of the 2010 parameter pairs used in the solution of the model on memory and innovation
Estimate Std. error t-value
Intercept 0.4222 0.0054 78.73
Memory −0.0165 0.0007 −24.36
Innovation −15.959 0.335 −47.70
Residual standard error: 0.0870.
Multiple R-squared: 0.5884.
Adjusted R-squared: 0.5880.
Figure 5: Surface fit using locally weighted non-linear regression of the mean value of the
HH Index in each of the 2010 parameter pairs on memory and innovation.
We can readily improve upon the linear by using the general non-linear
regression approach of local linear regression (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988).
This approach improves on simple polynomial fitting by adjusting the fitted
surface locally. Using the Generalised Cross validation criteria for model
selection (Golub et al., 1979), we choose the span parameter to be 50 percent.
The resulting regression gives a residual standard error of 0.0372, and an
adjusted R2 of 0.9248, using an effective number of parameters of 12. The
mean surface of the fit is plotted in Figure 5.
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5 Concluding remarks
Oligopolistic outcomes are prevalent in new product markets, especially in
markets which are primarily web based. Economic theory is mainly interested
in the implications of different types of market structure, such as perfect
competition and oligopoly. Our focus here is on the process by which different
levels of market concentration emerge in new product markets.
In any given market, there will undoubtedly be many reasons why a
particular market structure emerges. Here, we offer a general explanation,
which is based upon a behavioral rule of consumer choice which is realistic in
web based, new product markets.
The amount of information available to consumers in such markets is vast.
The various products typically differ in numerous and often incomprehensible
ways. We posit that in such markets, consumers essentially choose between
alternatives by using a rule which has its foundations in the theory of genetic
evolution. In the simplest version of the rule, agents do not select on the
basis of the attributes of the different alternatives available to them. In other
words, they are “neutral” with respect to these attributes, and the theory is
often described as being that of “neutral selection”. Clearly, this is an idealized
abstract, but in just the same way, so is the standard theory of consumer
choice in the economics textbooks.
An agent selects an alternative with a probability which is equal to the
proportion with which the product has been previously selected by other agents.
This is the theory advanced by Simon in 1955, and rediscovered independently
by Barabási and Albert in 1999, who gave the process the name of “preferential
attachment”. We use a rule which generalizes this basic rule in two ways. First,
we introduce a memory parameter, which specifies the number of previous
periods which the agent takes into account when considering the choices made
by others. Second, we introduce an “innovation” parameter, which allows the
agent, with a (small) probability defined by this parameter, not to use preferen-
tial attachment but instead to select from the available alternatives at random.
The market structure which emerges, and in particular the degree of
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is governed by
the values of the memory and innovation parameters. Essentially, the higher
the values of these parameters, the less concentrated the market outcome.
There are strong non-linearities as the parameters approach their lower bounds
of 1 for memory and 0 for innovation. In the neighbourhoods of such values,
strong market concentration is very likely to emerge.
The methodology and results we report might well be of more general inter-
est to the agent-based model building community in economics and the wider
social sciences. Typically, the results of large numbers of simulations of such
models are reported as the averages across the simulations. Here, we present in
graphical format the standard deviations around the mean of such simulations.
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We also develop “iso-contours” which show the ranges of the two param-
eters which give mean values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in various
ranges, and we illustrate the frequency with which values of the HH Index
within certain ranges are obtained for each of the parameter pairs, based on
1000 separate solutions of the model for each parameter pair. We choose the
ranges set out by The US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission: Unconcentrated markets: HHI below 0.15; Moderately Concentrated
markets: HHI between 0.15 and 0.25; Highly Concentrated markets: HHI
above 0.25.
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